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DRAFT:27 July 1965

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

AGREEMENT FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM


A. The National Reconnaissance Program

1. The NRP is a single program, national in character, to meet the intelligence needs of the Government, under a strong national leadership, for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long range for the collection of intelligence and mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations). The potentialities of U.S. technology and all operational resources and facilities must be aggressively and imaginatively exploited to develop and operate systems for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to the Government's intelligence needs and objectives.

2. The National Reconnaissance Program shall be responsive directly and solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board. Targeting and frequency of coverage of both satellite and manned aircraft missions over denied areas shall continue to be the responsibility of USIB, subject to the operational approval of the 303 Committee.

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A. The National Reconnaissance Program

"1. The NRP is a single program, national in character, to [be developed and maintained through a cooperative endeavor on the part of all agencies of the Government concerned.] The potentialities of U. S. technology must be aggressively and imaginatively exploited to develop systems for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to [national] intelligence needs and objectives."

Comment: The changes proposed appear to me to be relatively insignificant verbiage.

"2. . . . [Scheduling and] targeting of both satellite and manned aircraft missions over denied areas shall continue to be the responsibility of USIB, subject to the operational approval of the 303 Committee."

Comment: The change from "scheduling" to "frequency" resulted from a long discussion of the precise meaning of "scheduling." Dr. Fubini argues that CIA [redacted] actually schedules the TACKLE flights although USIB and the 303 Committee determine requirements for frequency. Frequency seems all right to me.

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
B. The Secretary of Defense

1. Will establish the NRO as a separate agency of the DoD;
2. Will choose a Director of the NRO who, subject to the provisions of paragraph D1, will report to him and be responsive to his instructions;
3. Will concur in the choice of the Deputy Director of NRO who will report to the DNRO and be responsive to his instructions;
4. Will review and approve the NRP budget;
5. Sit with members of the Executive Committee, when necessary, to reach decisions on issues on which Committee agreement could not be reached.

C. The Director of Central Intelligence will

1. Establish the collection priorities and requirements for the targeting of NRP operations and the establishment of their frequency of coverage;
2. Review the results obtained by the NRP and recommend, if appropriate, steps for improving such results;
3. Sit as a member of the Executive Committee;
4. Review and approve the NRP budget each year;

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B & C

Comment: New paragraph B was written, according to Dr. Fubini, to satisfy the Secretary of Defense's proclivity for having his individual responsibility clearly defined. Paragraph C spells out the DCI's individual responsibility.

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
5. Provide security policy guidance to maintain a uniform system in the whole NRP area.

D. National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee

1. An NRP Executive Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, is hereby established to formulate, guide and regulate the NRP through the DNRO. The DNRO will sit with the Executive Committee but will not be a voting member. If the Executive Committee can not agree on an issue the Secretary of Defense will be requested to sit with the Committee in discussing this issue and will arrive at a decision. The NRP Executive Committee shall:

- a. Establish an appropriate level of effort for the NRP in response to reconnaissance requirements provided by USIB and in the light of technical capabilities and fiscal limitations.
- b. Approve or modify the consolidated National Reconnaissance Program and its budget.
- c. Approve the allocation of responsibility and the corresponding funds for research and exploratory development

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D. National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee

"1. An NRP Executive Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense [and] the Director of Central Intelligence, is hereby established to formulate, guide and regulate the NRP through the DNRO. [On the invitation of the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence, the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology shall sit on this committee for the purpose of participating in decisions relating to research and development.] The NRP Executive Committee shall:"

Comment: As amended the agreement provides that, in the event of disagreement in the Executive Committee, the Secretary of Defense will make the final decision. This seems to me a reasonable arrangement because:

a. The DCI in any event has the right of appeal to the President via the National Security Council on matters where intelligence interests relating to the national security appear to be involved.

b. The agreement guarantees that the Secretary of Defense will act on a given matter only after a full discussion with the DCI and the Special Assistant for S&T. This is quite different from earlier proposed arrangements under which power to act and make decisions was delegated by the Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent for the Program, to the DNRO.

c. Although in theory this gives the Secretary of Defense the power to overrule decisions taken by a majority of the Executive Committee, he probably has this power anyway -- at least to the extent of suspending action with which he disagrees. In any event he would, I think, use it judiciously and sparingly if at all.

D.I.c.

Comment: The new proposed paragraph differs from the original in that the allocation of responsibility and funds to CIA for research and exploratory development is limited to work on "sensors" (e.g., cameras). It does not include work on spacecraft.

for new systems. Funds shall be adequate to ensure that a vigorous exploratory effort is achieved and maintained by the Department of Defense, the Military Services, and CIA to design and construct new sensors to meet intelligence requirements aimed at the acquisition of intelligence data.

d. Allocate development responsibilities and the corresponding funds for specific reconnaissance programs with a view to ensuring that the development, testing and production of new systems is accomplished with maximum efficiency by the component of the Government best equipped with facilities, experience and technical competence to undertake the assignment. It will also establish guidelines for collaboration between departments and for mutual support where appropriate. In general the Executive Committee will assign the responsibility for the development, testing and production of boosters, booster interface subsystems, spacecraft and reentry vehicles to an Air Force component recognizing, however, that sensors, spacecraft and reentry vehicles are integral components of a system, the development of which must proceed on a fully coordinated basis, with a view to ensuring optimum system development in support of intelligence requirements for overhead reconnaissance.

e. Assign operational responsibility for various types of manned overflight missions to CIA or DoD subject to the concurrence of the 303 Committee.

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D.1.d.

"Allocate development responsibilities and the corresponding funds for specific reconnaissance programs ~~(to the NRO or, in appropriate cases to CIA, the military services, and/or NASA)~~ with a view to ensuring that the development, testing and production of new systems is accomplished with maximum efficiency by the component of the Government best equipped with facilities, experience and technical competence to undertake the assignment. It will also establish guidelines for collaboration between departments and for mutual support where appropriate."

Comment:

1. The bracketed language is eliminated to exclude NASA. I doubt that we can make a very strong case for insisting on the inclusion of NASA as a source of development of reconnaissance systems.
2. The new language inserted generally gives the Air Force a qualified monopoly on the actual development of spacecraft, boosters, etc. Taken with the language of paragraph B.3.c. above, it could be used to curtail the scope of CIA's technical research activity. On the other hand, as presently written, the agreement envisages not only research but development and production of new sensors by the Agency (and military services). A "sensor" presumably means anything that is not a "booster," "spacecraft," etc. Moreover, the right to develop a sensor (e.g., a camera) would seem to include the right to examine alternative configurations of associated spacecraft, reentry vehicles, etc., and the Executive Committee is specifically given the authority to make sure that development of sensors and spacecraft proceed on a properly coordinated basis. The arrangement suggested should work, given reasonably cooperative attitudes on the part of DNRO and DDS&T.



f. Periodically review the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP.

2. The Executive Committee shall meet on the call of either the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence. All meetings will be attended by the DNRO and such staff advisors as the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence consider desirable.


E. National Reconnaissance Office

1. To implement the NRP, the Secretary of Defense will establish the NRO as a separate operating agency of the DoD.

2. The Director of the NRO shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director NRO:

a. Subject to review by the Executive Committee, and the provisions of Section B 3 above, shall have authority to initiate, approve, modify, redirect or terminate all research and development programs in the NRP. Ensure, through appropriate recommendations to the Executive Committee for the assignment of research and development responsibilities and the allocation of funds, that the full potentialities of agencies

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E. 2.

"The Director of the NRO shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense and be responsive solely to the NRP Executive Committee."

Comment: The elimination of provision making the DNRO responsive "solely" to the Executive Committee leaves the DNRO status somewhat ambiguous. On the other hand, the authority of the DNRO is clearly limited by reference to the provision relating to the powers reserved to the Executive Committee as such.

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of the Government concerned with reconnaissance are realized for the invention, improvement and development of reconnaissance systems to meet USIB requirements.

b. Shall have authority to require that he be kept fully and completely informed by all Agencies and Departments of the Government of all programs and activities undertaken as part of the NRP.

c. Maintain and provide to the Executive Committee (or to their designated representatives) records of the status of all projects, programs and activities of the NRP in the research, development, production and/or operational phases.

d. Prepare a comprehensive budget for all aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program.

e. Establish a fiscal control and accounting procedure to ensure that all funds expended in support of the National Reconnaissance Program are fully accounted for an appropriately utilized by the agencies concerned. In particular, the budget shall show separately those funds to be applied to research

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and exploratory design, systems development, procurement, and operational activities. Funds expended or obligated under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence under Public Law 110 shall be administered and accounted for by CIA and will be reported to DNRO in accordance with agreed upon procedures.

f. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP.

3. The Deputy Director NRO shall be appointed by the DCI with the concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall serve full time in a line position directly under the Director NRO. The Deputy Director shall act for and exercise the powers of the Director, NRO during his absence or disability.

4. The NRO shall be jointly staffed in such a fashion to reflect the best talent available from the CIA, the three military departments and other Government agencies. The NRO staff will report to the DNRO and DDNRO and will maintain no allegiance to the originating agency or department.

F. Initial Allocation of Program Responsibilities

1. Responsibility for existing programs of the NRP shall be allocated as indicated in Annex A attached hereto.